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The risk of conflict is exasperated by a multitude of internal and external factors. Current multi-
variate analysis paints diverse causal risk profiles that vary with time. However, these profiles evolve
and a universal model to understand that evolution remains absent. Most of the current conflict
analysis is data-driven and conducted at the individual country or region level, often in isolation.
Consistent consideration of multi-scale interactions and their non-linear dynamics is missing.
Here, we develop a multiplexed network model, where each city is modeled as a non-linear bi-
stable system with stable states in either war or peace. The causal factor categories which exasperate
the risk of conflict are each modeled as a network layer. We consider 3 layers: (1) core geospatial
network of interacting cities reflecting ground level interactions, (2) cultural network of interacting
countries reflecting cultural groupings, and (3) political network of interacting countries reflecting
alliances. Together, they act as drivers to push cities towards or pull cities away from war.
Using a variety of data sources that overlap consistently between 2002 − 2016, we show, that
our model is able to correctly predict the transitions from war to peace and peace to war with F1
score of 0.78 to 0.92 worldwide at the city scale resolution. As many conflicts during this period
are auto-regressive (e.g. the War on Terror in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Narco War across the
Americas), it is important to show that we can predict the emergence of new war or new peace.
Indeed, we demonstrate successful predictions across a wide range of conflict genres and we go on
to perform causal discovery by identifying which model component led to the correct prediction.
A variety of diverse conflict case studies were generated: Somalia (2008-13), Myanmar (2013-15),
Colombia (2011-14), Libya (2014-16), and Yemen (2011-13). In all these cases, we identify the set
of most likely causal factors and how it may differ across a country and change over time.
I. INTRODUCTION
Whilst conflict remains one of the greatest economic damages and barriers to the UN sustainable development
goals, a systematic understanding of its time-varying causal factors on a global scale remains absent. Yet, under-
standing conflict and making useful predictions is vital to informing peacekeeping and diplomatic activities [71, 73].
Examples include prioritising peacekeeping resources, identifying causal factors in peace negotiations, and informing
interventions such as embargo and political pressure [74, 98, 100, 108].
There are many forms of conflict and its nature has evolved in recent history. Since the end of the Cold War,
the frequency and severity of conventional state conflict has decreased [97, 117]. On the other hand, there has been
a steady increase in political violence by non-state actors and by international criminal organisations. Protracted
political violence [110, 112, 114] plague many regions in the world across different genres [72], ranging from the War
on Terror in the Middle East, the Narco-War in the Americas, persistent ethnolinguistic violence in South Asia, to
intermittent civil wars in Sub-Saharan Africa.
A. Current Approaches
Current conflict modeling can be largely categorised as statistical regression or mechanical model fitting.
1. Statistical Models
Statistical models started in the 1940s with general laws on the frequency and severity of major wars by Lewis
Fry Richardson [92], and this line of enquiry has been extended to modern conflicts [74, 75, 95, 96] as well as urban
terrorism events [76]. Other temporal trend analysis have attempted to discover cycles in human decision processes
(e.g. memory of wars) and climate cycles (e.g. dry-wet cycles affect agricultural output) , [89, 115]. Whilst these
trends can inform us of the both the nature (e.g. memoryless) and likelihood of new events, they do not identify a
wide range of causal factors (e.g. climate change [79, 104, 105], ethnolinguistic tensions [111], and natural resources
[110]) and are often only accurate at very rough resolutions. Detailed multi-variate analysis can confirm or discover
new insights into ongoing violence [73, 99], but the profile of factors will vary across regions and evolve over time.
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2Whilst such analysis finds use in quasi-static periods of conflict, e.g. the auto-regressive War on Terror, where a
self-consistent behaviour is present; it has trouble predicting the emergence of new crisis (e.g. Ukraine conflict) or
the sudden end of a protracted conflict (e.g. Colombia peace agreement). Indeed, even current machine learning
approaches, which are effectively automated regression models, perform well for white swan conflict events and poorly
for black swan events [71]. The open challenge for statistical models remain the non-linear time-varying nature of
conflict.
2. Mechanistic Models
Mechanistic models are useful in describing the non-linear dynamics of conflict. Classical examples include applying
the Hawkes process, which is a self-excitation behavioural modeled [101]. Here, the assumption is that successful
attacks encourage both the attacker to repeat their success, but also exacts counter-measures by the security forces.
This has been successfully implemented for IED attacks in Northern Ireland, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Expanding this
model to a spatial diffusion process, recent work on the Afghan War Diaries have integrated point conflict processes
with a stochastic integral kernel [77, 119] to create a dynamic diffusion map. Other models also examine spatial
correlations between conflict dynamics and infer a causation network for analysis [94]. Long term agent based models
based on a series of dynamics have also been applied to historical contexts [93].
B. Contribution & Coverage
1. Current Limitations & Our Novelty
Current models are lacking in explaining several aspects of conflicts:
1. how does the set of causal factors which exasperate conflict vary across space and evolve over time?
2. why do certain locations suffer a disproportionate level of violence [118] (relative to rest of the conflict region
and their population size)?
3. how can we build a quantitative model that integrates diverse causal factors ranging from geography to politics
to ethnolinguistic tensions.
Here, we attempt to resolve the above 3 shortcomings in research by the following approach:
1. model each city as a bi-stable system, where it will always gravitate towards war or peace, with an unstable
intermediary skirmish or risk of war state. This enables us to model the nonlinear dynamics with the simplest
model (used in prevalence in ecology and biology). Causal factors then contribute to the model by pushing it
towards or pulling it away from conflict.
2. connect each city via a multi-layered spatial interaction network, whereby the network structure itself reveals
vulnerable contentious points that we argue to be at a higher risk of violence [130].
3. integrate the above into a global framework, whereby the tuning parameters are trained on previous conflict
data to: (a) make predictions, and (b) discover which set of evolving causal factors dominate.
2. Data Sources and Study Period
In this paper, we consider both non-state terrorism and conventional warfare from 2002 to 2016, for which there
is spatially accurate reporting of violent events based on the Global Terrorism Database (GDT). We attempt to
model 3 general measures of causality for conflict: (1) current and recent conflict history, (2) cultural affinity, and (3)
political relation. We know that many conflict in sub-Saharan Africa are extremely regressive and therefore point (1)
is important. The data input for (1) uses the previous state of conflict and the neighbouring current states of conflict.
In (2), we account for cultural diversity at the country level by using a database of the religious background of the
population of each country [140]. In (3), we use a variety of data sources to infer the nature of the country’s political
relation with other countries. We first use data from [138] to check if there are formal alliance relationships (e.g.
NATO, EU) and then go on to check if there are arms trade in recent years. Whilst positive relations are reflected
3in this manner, inferring negative relations is difficult. As such, we infer that the absence of any political treaties or
military trade implies a frosty or hostile relationship.
Resolution wise, we work per year and for (1), the resolution is at a city and surround region level, and for (2) and
(3) it is at the country level, which is then uniformly associated with each city in those countries.
3. Organisation of Paper
The paper is organised as following. In section II we introduce the network, how it is derived and its multiplex
structure. In section III we introduce the dynamical model we implement on the network. In section IV and V we
show results of simulations and predictions based on data and discuss their significance in relation to other methods.
In section VI we consider the role of network structure in identifying high conflict areas. In section VII we consider
specific cases and show how the model allows one to trace causal links to the emergence of conflict events, followed
by final remarks.
II. MULTIPLEXED INTERACTION NETWORK
We consider a set of N = 7323 cities worldwide distributed. We implement on this set a multiplexed network con-
sisting of 3-Layers, as illustrated Figure 1: from bottom up we have core Geography, strength of political relationships
and a cultural layer accounting for the cultural differences between populations of different countries.
The nodes in the geographic layer represent cities/towns and the links in the layer represent interactions between
nodes. Each node is also attached to its country and countries are linked via political and cultural interactions. Within
a layer, the links between different nodes represent interactions. The state of a node, measured by the variable xci ,
with i denoting the city and c its country affiliation, is the focus of the model. This variable represents a well-being
factor, which in ecology is commonly population, but in our case, it is the ultrasociety power, i.e., the strength of the
cooperation, which, as originally introduced in [93], is a key indicator of the strength of a society. Our dynamic model,
introduced in Section III, follows the evolution of this variable in each node, characterised by transitions between poor
(war) and optimal (peace) well-being due to interactions with the other nodes via the different layers of the multiplex
structure of the network.
Worldwide 
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c
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q
xjc
xjq
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Countries interaction-culture                                                                                         
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City Level Interaction 
Country Affinity:
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FIG. 1: Three-layers structure of the multiplex-network on which the model is implemented.
4A. Geographic layer: Adjacency matrix
We follow the same procedure detailed in [130] and consider an entropy maximizing coupling dynamics between
cities [132, 133] to define the adjacency matrix for the network of cities. The entropy maximisation allows one to
derive the flows between nodes in the network by maximising the entropy with the natural constraints on the origin-
destination matrix and an overall cost [132]. More precisely, in a constrained system, where each city has a finite
capacity to interact with neighbours, the flow between nodes can be measured via the Boltzmann-Lotka-Volterra
(BLV) model (see [134] for a review). Let Fij be the flow between nodes i and j in the geographic layer and F the
total possible flow on the network, the likelihood W (Fij) of a given flow between two nodes is [132]:
W (Fij) =
F !
ΠijFij
(1)
The most likely value for Fij is obtained by maximising the logarithm of (1), which can be shown to be equivalent
to maximising the entropy
∑
ij Fij logFij . As shown in [132] maximising entropy with constraints on a global flow
energy, on the total flow Xi coming from a single node and on the total capacity of the system (depending on node
capacity Zi) leads to
Fij = X
a
i
Zbj/f(dij)∑
k Z
b
k/f(dik)
, (2)
where f is a function of the distance dij between nodes. Setting Zi and Xi equal to population pi in node i reproduces
the gravity law (a part from normalisation term), widely observed in real space networks constrained by geographic
distances (see [84–86] and references therein). We adopt this procedure and derive the flows on the network, the
weights of the adjacency matrix are then defined as the inverse of the flows.
A clustering radius of 500 Km is introduced, representing 0.5 % of the global surface and only cities within this
radius are connected. As shown in [130] this radius lies at the transition to percolation over the global network. Also,
cities separated by sea of a distance larger than 50 Km, are disconnected. We limit ourselves for this paper only to
land travel and short distance water travel between cities to build our network. Distances are evaluated using latitude
and longitude data and geodesic distance. See [130] for further details.
B. Political layer and Alliance Matrix
We extract political alliance relationships from one data set including alliances between 183 countries from 1950
to 2015, provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) [138] for years up to 2012 and
integrated with arm trade data and data from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) project [139].
We assume the absence of any political treaty or arm trade as indication of hostile relationship. We use this information
to build an alliance matrix P with ±1 values for enemy (E) or ally (F) relationship between nodes. The political
relationship in combination with the state of the nodes determines the sign of the interaction between of two nodes in
our model (see Section III and Eqs. (5), (6)), i.e. whether the interaction strengthens or destabilises the well-being
of the node.
C. Cultural Layer
It is reasonable to expect that cultural difference/similarity between countries will affect the way they interact,
respectively enhancing or mitigating friction between countries arising from political-economical competition. We
implement this in our network and dynamical model by gathering information from a dataset including statistics of
religious affiliation of population for 167 countries. We build a vector for each country with each component of the
vector representing the percentage of population for each religious affiliation. We then define a cultural distance dc
between countries as the Euclidean distance between these vectors. For the few countries where no data is available
we assume as demographics, an average over all other countries. We weigh with this distance the interaction term
between nodes so as to increase or decrease the drag of the interaction towards conflict according to the degree of
cultural difference between the nodes involved. The reasoning behind this choice is that the push on a node towards
war should be dampened when neighbour node belongs to countries with similar cultural background and heightened
by different cultural background. Accordingly, the push towards peace should be stronger when the cultural difference
5between two interacting nodes is low and weaker when it is high. We therefore define the matrix Cij which weighs the
interaction between nodes based on the cultural difference between the populations as:
Cij =
{
dc(i, j), if i, j enemies
1− dc(i, j), if i, j allies (3)
this term will implement the effect of the cultural layer of the network on the dynamics (see Eq. 6) exactly in the
way described above.
D. Datesets
We adopt the following data sets:
World cities data: 7323 cities with their latitude, longitude, and population data from National Geospatial Intelli-
gence Agency [136]. The data represents a quarter of the world’s total population and includes over 2800 cities with
a population over 100,000 units, yielding a sufficiently high city resolution. Each city is also tagged with its country
and province affiliation.
Conflict data: For terrorism and insurgency violence: the Correlates of War [137] database is used, with over
180,000 conflict incidents between 2002 and 2016. The GTD contains the number of attacks and death-toll, ranging
from small-scale attacks (1 death) to large-scale massacres (1000s dead). Most of the death-toll data is time stamped
and geo-tagged (longitude and latitude).
Political alliance date: we use arm trade and political alliance data as provided by the Correlates of War (CoW)
project [137] integrated to fill for years from 2012 to 2016 with data from Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI) [138] and the Rice University Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) project [139].
Religious affiliation data: statistics of world countries populations according to the PEW Research Center [140] as
a measure of the cultural difference between cities of different countries.
III. MODEL
Like many ecological systems, the dynamics of population or growth power (well-being) can be modelled by a 3rd
order polynomial, which is equivalent to having a double-well potential. Therefore in each node i we have
dxi
dτ
=
(
1− xi
ai
)(
1 +
xi
ci
)
(xi − bi) + εHi (4)
where we drop the country index, as compared to notation in Fig. 1 in order to lighten notation. In the following
lower indexes i, j, k refer to nodes in the geographic layer of the network. We use τ to indicate the dynamical time on
which Eqs. (4) are run until all nodes reach a steady-state, to differentiate it from the real time to which data refer.
The rate of well-being/growth power in a node is determined by: (i) a regressive component (stronger nodes tend to
get stronger), (ii) a capacity limit ( a node cannot be stronger than natural resources dictate), (iii) a critical mass
threshold (must be of a minimal size to grow), and (iv) a constant ’field’ term (varying from year to year) related to
generic external factors. In this particular third order dynamics, there are up to three equilibrium points, two stable
and one unstable in between. The "external field" term may take in account other economic parameters, trade or
resource availability which can shift the equilibrium of the nodes. Interpreting this, we may understand the following:
-When there is only one positive equilibrium point, the society is peaceful and strong. Possibly leading to it being
a pure aggressor.
-When there are three equilibrium points, the society can enter a state of uncertainty (middle equilibrium) and
then war (undesirable equilibrium).
-If the undesirable equilibrium is positive, peace is possible. If it is negative, it will devastate the population to the
point of no recovery. To induce transition from one stable equilibrium to another, we use external forces from other
cities, whereby the sign of the forcing (±) is determined by national relationships and current node states.
In the self-dynamic equation (4), ai controls the size of the largest equilibrium, bi (bi < ai) controls the unstable
brink equilibrium and ci the smallest equilibrium. For systems with a favourable Hi value, there exists only one
positive equilibrium that is above ai, meaning society will flourish beyond its natural capacity. For systems with a
negative Hi value, there may exist only one negative equilibrium value, meaning that society will vanish.
6FIG. 2: Driving dynamics in Eq. 1 (a) and relative potential with induced transitions (b).
A. Interaction
The coupling dynamics that reinforces or weakens the well-being of a city due to interaction with neighbours is
given by:
dxi
dτ
= −γi
∑
j AijxiSijPijf(dij)xj∑
k xiAikxkf(dik)
(5)
with Aij the adjacency matrix, Pij the matrix of political alliances, with value ±1 indicating friend(F)/enemy (E) and
f(dij) a function of the geographical distance. The operator Sij is introduced to ensure that the sign of interaction
reflects the political alliance and the state of each interacting couple of nodes i, k. Namely, if node k is in a war state,
here defined as xk < 0, it will tend to drag an ally i to war as well, that is, it will push node i towards negative values
xi < 0. A neighbour enemy node will have the same effect. In all other cases, Sik ensures that the effect of node k on
i is to push the node i towards a peace state (xi > 0). These conditions on Sik are easily implemented algorithmically
in our simulations. For the distance function f(d) we adopt an inverse square law. γi is a positive parameter vector
which accounts for local variability in the strength of the interaction.
B. Combined Dynamics
Combining self- and coupling-dynamics yields from Eqs.(4) and (5):
dxi
dτ
=
(
1− xi
ai
)(
1 +
xi
ci
)
(xi − bi) + εHi − γi
∑
j xiAijPijSijCijf(dij)xj∑
k xiAikxkf(dik)
(6)
where we have added the cultural layer Cij as defined in (3), weighing cultural differences between nodes. Depending
on the sign of Pij and nodes states the coupling dynamic can either lower the risk margin or increase the risk margin
of war. We track the number of equilibria for each city and whether it is in a high or low equilibrium state during a
long simulation time (to achieve steady state). Low equilibrium corresponds to conflict.
IV. MODEL RESULTS ON AGGREGATE DATA
We run simulations of Eq. 6 for our set of 7323 cities, implemented via Euler standard integration method and
allow the dynamics to reach steady state. We consider here the case of ε = 0 and leave for future development the
7possibility of using other date for the impact of economic or other resource factors to the nodes dynamics. We chose
as well parameters ai = 1 and bi = 0 and ci = 1for all nodes. With this choice the potential profile in Eq. (4) becomes
a double-well with bottoms at x = −1 and x = 1 respectively. Figure 3 shows the simulations at steady state in a 3D
space on aggregate data from 2002 to 2016, where the x axis is the well-being value according to the dynamics (6).
On the y axis we plot in logarithmic scale the value of the betweenness at each node and on the z axis the number of
conflict events per year in each node (averaged over the period 2002-2016). We aggregate in each node the number
of events occurring per year in an aera of radius R = 500Km around the node. Our model classifies on negative x
conflict areas and peaceful areas on positive x. The plot visually shows in red conflict areas with a number of conflict
events per year larger than a threshold which is determined by maximising the F1 score. This value corresponds to
40 events which coincides with the average value of number events per year and per node in our data set. We adopt
in the following this threshold as discriminant of war/peace state in a node. From Figure 3 one can already see how
high conflict areas, those with higher number of events per year, tend to accumulate on large value of y, i..e. in the
high betweenness areas. We will see that adding betweenness as a classifier increases the model predictive power of
high conflict areas.
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FIG. 3: (Left)Simulation of model based on aggregate data 2002− 2016. Node coordinates , betweenness and number of
conflict events are reported respectively on x,y and z axis. Maximum F1 score, calculated with respect to the aggregate
conflict data of same period, is 0.99 reached for threshold value of 40 number of events per year.Red dots represent areas with
number of attacks per year > threshold value. Black dots areas with lower number of events. (Right)2D projection on x-z
plane (above) and z-y plane (below) of same plot. Orange line marks threshold on number of events
V. MODEL PREDICTIONS AFTER TRAINING
We then test the predictive power of our model. We train the model on the previous available years prior to the
year on which we want to make predictions. We therefore estimate the coefficients γi based on the training examples
given by the data and run the model with these learnt parameters to make prediction for the chosen year. In Fig. 4
and Fig. 5 we plot the results for year 2016 and 2015 respectively, based on training on previous years starting from
2002 and considering as threshold for a war/peace state the value of 40 events per year. Initial conditions for the
8dynamical equations are taken based on data of previous year and mapped, based on the threshold of 40 events, on
the coordinate space of the dynamical variables xi for the nodes of the network. If the average value of events on the
training years in a given node is smaller/larger than the threshold and the number of events in the year considered in
the given node is larger/smaller than the threshold, we mark the occurrence of a new war/peace event in that node.
In the plot red and green dots represent respectively such new conflict and peace areas arising in 2016 as compared
to training. While blue and black dots represent conflict and peace areas which did not change state compared to
training. Table I reports the performance of the model based on different measures in the case of binary classification
war/peace of each node state. These measures are defined as:
Accuracy =
number of correct predictions
total number of predictions
Recall =
number of true positives
number of false positives + number of true positives
Precision =
number of true positives
number of false negatives + number of true positives
F1 = 2
Precision× Recall
Precision + Recall
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FIG. 4: Simulation for year 2016 run after training over years 2002− 2015. (Left) Node coordinates , betweenness and
number of conflict events are reported respectively on x,y and z axis. Bigger red and green dots indicate areas which have
shifted respectively to conflict or peace state as compared to previous year. Small blue and black dots indicate respectively
ares of conflict and peace, which have not changed state as compared to previous year (see Table I , II for a quantitative
analysis). (Right) 2D projection on x-z plane (above) and z-y plane (below) of same plot. Orange line marks threshold on
number of events.
The results in Table I show a good performance of our model in overall predicting the states of the nodes of the
network. More crucial is to predict the new events. In Table II we show how the model performs on these events,
showing an average total accuracy over the years of more than 55%.
9measure/year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
1 Accuracy 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.93 0.92 0.96
2 F1 0.81 0.92 0.89 0.78 0.85 0.78 0.78 0.85 0.86 0.81 0.82 0.91
3 Recall 0.99 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.78 0.89 0.72 0.99 0.93 0.9 0.88 0.88
4 Precision 0.68 0.89 0.83 0.64 0.94 0.7 0.85 0.75 0.8 0.73 0.77 0.95
TABLE I: Accuracy, F1 score, recall and precision for predictions based on model after training over previous years.
Threshold for war/peace discrimination is 40 events
Model performance on new conflict/peace occurrences
year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
green dots in x > 0 73 49 54 1 1 42 50 63 53 52 57 57
green dots in x < 0 0 7 5 2 32 59 67 0 7 34 16 48
% correct peace 100% 87% 91% 33% 3% 41% 43% 100% 88% 60% 78% 54%
red dots in x < 0 66 66 62 102 155 123 155 187 255 278 362 479
red dots in x > 0 100 49 89 271 45 273 75 218 193 369 337 65
% correct war 40% 57 % 41% 27% 78% 31% 67% 47% 57% 43% 53% 89%
% correct total 58% 67 % 55% 27% 67% 33% 59% 53% 61% 45% 55% 83%
TABLE II: Performance of the model on predicting occurrence of new changes of node state to conflict or peace for years
2005-2016.
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FIG. 5: Simulation for year 2015 run after training over years 2002− 2014. (Left)Node coordinates , betweenness and
number of conflict events are reported respectively on x,y and z axis. Bigger red and green dots indicate areas which have
shifted respectively to conflict or peace state as compared to previous year. Small blue and black dots indicate respectively
ares of new conflict and peace.(Right) (Right) 2D projection on x-z plane (above) and z-y plane (below) of same plot. Orange
line marks threshold on number of events. (see Table I , II for a quantitative analysis).
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A. Comparison with Linear Regression
We run linear regression to see how it compares to results of our model. We consider the number of conflict events
of e.g. 2015 and linearly fit to the number of events of previous year 2014. We then use fitting parameters to predict
events of year 2016 based on previous year events. In tables III and IV we show how Linear Regression fares as
compared to our model. Both in overall prediction and on predicting new events our model fares better (see tables
I,II, III, IV ). In fact, on average per year our model fares better than Linear Regression in terms of accuracy (0.96
vs 0.95), of average F1 score (0.84 vs 0.81) and also on new events (55 % vs 49%), see also Fig. 6 for summary
plot.Figures 9 and 10 (see Appendix) show examples of time series for model and LR for two cities.
measure/year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
1 Accuracy 0.0.96 0.98 0.98 0.94 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.92 0.92 0.93
2 F1 0 0.7 0.9 0.87 0.75 0.85 0.76 0.8 0.85 0.88 0.78 0.81 0.84
3 Recall 0.54 0.83 0.8 0.61 0.86 0.71 0.89 0.83 0.84 0.68 0.73 0.78
4 Precision 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.97 0.84 0.81 0.72 0.87 0.93 0.91 0.9 0.9
TABLE III: Accuracy, F1 score, recall and precision for predictions based on Linear Regression. Threshold for war/peace
discrimination is 40 events
Linear Regression performance on new conflict/peace occurrences
year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
% new peace correct 100% 100% 95% 33% 12% 4% 9% 6% 20% 44% 64% 48%
% new war correct 56 % 61% 45% 26% 63% 36% 62% 61% 61% 33% 42% 43%
% total new correct 69 % 73% 59% 26% 55% 30% 44% 53% 56% 34% 43% 44%
TABLE IV: Performance of linear regression on predicting occurrence of new changes of node state to conflict or peace for
years 2005-2016.
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FIG. 6: Comparison of F1 score, total accuracy and accuracy on predicting new events (NE) between model and Linear
Regression (LR).
VI. BETWEENNESS INDIVIDUATES HIGH CONFLICT AREAS IN THREE-STATE
CLASSIFICATION
Betweenness or betweenness centrality is a quantity defined for each node of a network as the sum of all the
shortest paths between two other nodes of the network passing through the node in consideration. More precisely the
betweenness centrality b(i) of node i is defined as
b(i) =
∑
j 6=i6=k
σjk(i)
σjk
(7)
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where σjk is the total number of shortest paths between nodes j and k and σjk(i) is the number of shortest paths
between j and k that pass through node i. As shown in [130] it is apparent that conflict areas with higher number of
conflict events tend to coincide with network nodes with higher betweenness. Here we aim at quantifying this trend
by introducing a third classification state, high intensity conflict , and using betweenness as an indicator of this state.
So we classify as peaceful areas those nodes with x > 0 and then we identify as low conflict areas those with x < 0
and betweenness<threshold, and high intensity conflict areas, those with x < 0 AND betweenness>threshold. The
thresholds adopted are 40 events per year for the low conflict threshold and 770 events per year for the high conflict
data. We determine the latter as average over the threshold values that maximise the F1 score for the predictions for
each year.
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FIG. 7: Simulation for year 2016 run after training over years 2002− 2016. Node coordinates , betweenness and number of
conflict events are reported respectively on x,y and z axis. Bigger red, yellow and green dots indicate areas which have shifted
respectively to conflict or peace state as compared to previous years. Small blue and black dots indicate respectively ares of
conflict and peace, which have not changed state as compared to previous year. (Right) 2D projection on x-z plane of same
plot. Orange line marks threshold on number of events. (see Table V for a quantitative analysis.
By defining the relative 3× 3 confusion matrix M which in element Mij has the number of actual events of type j
classified as i. One can then evaluate true and false positives and true and false negatives and consequently precision,
recall and F1 score. A measure of how the model performs is therefore obtained.
We find an improved overall F1 score. Table V show F1 score for this non-binary classification and performance
on new conflict and peace events on the predictions for year 2005-2016. Figure 7 shows how the colouring of Figure 4
obtained for binary classification, changes when taking into account betweennes and high-conflict areas in a three-state
classification. From Table V it is also apparent how the accuracy of the model in predicting new high conflict states
becomes high when using betweenness as classifier. This strengthens the importance of betweenness in individuating
high conflict areas.
In Figure 8 we plot the results of simulation of Figure 4 mapped on the earth surface, this figure gives a visual
representation of how nodes with high betweenness strongly correlate with high conflict, as resulting from quantitative
analysis.
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measure/year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
1 Accuracy 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.96
2 F1 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.91 0.94
TABLE V: Accuracy and F1 score for predictions based on model after training over previous years. Threshold for peace,
low and high conflict discrimination are 40 and 770 events respectively.
FIG. 8: Simulation for year 2016 run after training over years 2002− 2015 mapped on the earth surface. Nodes are
represented as triangles. Colour of nodes goes from yellow to red with increasing number of conflict events. Size of triangles is
proportional to the logarithm of betweenness. Triangles pointing down indicate conflict area as resulting from model
prediction. Triangles pointing up indicate peace area. Blu links are alliances while green links are non-collaborative country
relations.
VII. TRACING CAUSAL LINKS TO NEW WAR AND PEACE EVENTS
The interesting feature of our dynamical model is that allows us to trace back the transition of a node state to
its dynamical cause. We achieve this by considering a node that changes state as compared to previous year and
disconnecting the neighbour nodes in a systematic way to see how this changes the final steady state of the node of
interest. More specifically we disconnect all neighbours from same country at the same time and run simulation and
observe if a change in the final state of the node occurs.
We repeat the same operation for the the geographical, political and cultural layers to see if a change occurs. For
the geographical level links are removed, for the political layer the alliance is shifted, while for the cultural layer no
difference between populations is assumed. This allows us to trace back the cause of the change of state of the node.
We focus here on five countries and illustrate the results stemming from our model.
In the case of Somalia , for example, where our model is able to predict new events with an overall accuracy of
95% we see that for the city of Buur Gaabo, disconnecting at the political level, i.e. shifting relationship of Kenia
from enemy (E) to ally (F) induce a change in the node state from war to peace. This linking a possible tensions at
the border as leading to conflict. The fact that disconnecting the geographic layer for the same city with neighbour
nodes of the same country, leads to a peace state, on the other hand, points towards more the long-standing internal
struggles of Somalia.
In the case of Myanmar on the other hand we see that only disconnecting the geographic layer leads to a shift
of outcome in the steady states of the nodes. In all cases illustrated disconnecting neighbours of same countries
leads to peace, hinting again at internal causes of conflict. Only in the case of Sittwe we see that to induce change
disconnecting links to Bangladesh and India, two enemy countries, is necessary. Finally in Colombia we see that the
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Causal links to new events, Somalia. Overall accuracy on new events: 65%
Year city current
state
previous year
state
layer
disconnected
country
disconnected
current state
with layer
disconnected
2008 Buur
Gaabo
War Peace Geographic Somalia Peace
2008 Buur
Gaabo
War Peace Political Kenia (E) Peace
2013 Hurdiyo War Peace Geographical Somalia Peace
2013 Hurdiyo War Peace Geographical Somaliland(E) Peace
2009 Gaalkacyo War Peace Geographical Ethiopia
(E)+ So-
malia+
Somaliland
(E)
Peace
2009 Eyl War Peace Geographical Somalia+
Somaliland
Peace
Causal links to new events, Myamnar.Overall accuracy on new events: 49%
Year city current
state
previous state layer
disconnected
country
disconnected
current state
with layer
disconnected
2013 Sittwe War Peace Geographic Bangladesh
(E) +In-
dia(E)
+Myanmar
Peace
2014 Magway War Peace Geographic Myanmar Peace
2015 KyaukphyuWar Peace Geographic Myanmar Peace
2013 Taunggyi War Peace Geographic Myanmar Peace
Causal links to new events: Colombia. Overall accuracy on new events: 65%
Year city current
state
previous year
state
layer
disconnected
country
disconnected
current state
with layer
disconnected
2014 Jurado War Peace Geographic Colombia Peace
2011 Valledupar Peace War Political Colombia War
2011 Valledupar Peace War Political Venezuela (F) War
2012 Tame War Peace Geographic Colombia Peace
2012 Orocue War Peace Geographic Colombia+
Venezuela (F)
Peace
2014 Santa
Marta
War Peace Geographic Colombia Peace
TABLE VI
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shift of alliance of Venezuela causes change from peace to war state in Valledupar in 2011, while in all other cases
disconnecting links to neighbours of same country changes node state from war to peace, hinting at internal source of
conflict.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper have introduced a new model for predicting conflict. Starting from a geospatial network of cities
and adding political and cultural layers we have implemented on a multiplex network structure a dynamical model
describing the evolution of the state of each city/node between a conflict or peace state due to interaction with other
nodes. We have taken into account political alliances and cultural differences between populations and shown that
our model is able to predict with high accuracy the well-being state of each node. The model overall performs better
than linear regression and performs rather well on predicting new occurrences of peace and war, which is less trivial.
Adding betweenness as a classifier of high conflict states increases the overall performance of the model induced
classification, confirming the observed link between high conflict areas and betweenness centrality as first observed
in [130]. Importantly our model allows one to trace back in many cases the causal link to the occurrence of change
of state in a node, which is crucial as a more advanced version of the model could allow one to develop a better
understanding of the dynamics leading to conflicts in risk areas, informing more effective preventive policies. Our
model offer a promising platform for predicting conflict and can be further improved with additional feature and
layers, e.g. using data of economic growth or resource availability for the field term H, or adding maritime trade data.
This will lead to further improved performance and are part of future development.
Appendix: Libya and Yemen
Here are reported the results obtained running simulations and disconnecting layers in nodes where there is a
change of state, for the states of Libya and Yemen. In both cases main causal link for change of state is traced in the
interaction with cities from the same country, hinting at internal source of conflict.
[1] W. Guo and K. Gleditsch and A. Wilson, “Retool AI to Forecast and Limit Wars,” Nature, (2018).
[2] C. Raleigh, “Urban Violence Patterns Across African States,” International Studies Review, (2015).
[3] H. Hegre et al., “ViEWS: A political violence early-warning system,” Journal of Peace Research, (219).
15
Causal links to new events, Libya. Overall accuracy on new events: 56%
Year city current
state
previous year
state
layer
disconnected
country
disconnected
current state
with layer
disconnected
2016 Tmassah War Peace Geographic Libya Peace
2014 Hun War Peace Geographic Libya Peace
2014 Ghadamis War Peace any any No change
2014 Hun War Peace any any No change
Causal links to new events, Yemen. Overall accuracy on new events: 71%
Year city current
state
previous year
state
layer
disconnected
country
disconnected
current state
with layer
disconnected
2013 Al Ghaydah War Peace Geographic Yemen Peace
2011 Al
Hudaydah
War Peace any any No change
2011 Sadah War Peace any any No change
2011 Ibb War Peace any any No change
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